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Abstract
Henkin, Monk and Tarski gave a compositional semantics for first-order predicate
logic. We extend this work by including function symbols in the language and by
giving the denotation of the atomic formula as a composition of the denotations of its
predicate symbol and of its tuple of arguments. In addition we give the denotation
of a term as a composition of the denotations of its function symbol and of its tuple
of arguments.
1 Introduction
To introduce compositional semantics we can do no better than to quote [6]:
The standard interpretation of compositionality is that for basic expres-
sions a meaning is given, and that operations are defined on these meanings
which yield meanings for compound expressions. Almost all modern linguistic
theories which give serious attention to semantics follow this idea, [. . .]
First-order predicate logic is one of the linguistic theories where serious attention is given
to semantics. As the language of this logic is formal, its semantics should, a fortiori,
be compositional. The first semantics, [12] ([14] in German, [13] in English) was not
compositional. The first compositional semantics ([15], [3]) omits function symbols from
the language and stops short of providing a compositional semantics of atomic formulas
and of terms. In [17] this work was extended by including function symbols in the language.
It was also extended by giving the denotation of the atomic formula as a composition of
the denotations of its predicate symbol and of its tuple of arguments. However, [17] was
restricted to logic programs with Herbrand semantics. In the present paper we extend this
work in several directions.
• We remove the restriction to Herbrand semantics and make the results applicable to
arbitrary interpretations.
• We remove the restriction to logic programs
• We not only provide a compositional semantics for atomic formulas, but also for
composite terms.
The initial impetus for the present paper was to give compositional semantics for terms
and for atomic formulas by relating the meaning of the function or predicate symbols to the
meanings of the tuples of the terms that occur as arguments. In pursuit of this purpose,
interpretations acquire a central position. Once we obtained our basic results we needed
1
2to link these to the compositional semantics already established in [3]. The presence of
interpretations and function symbols forced us to deviate from their method. The result
is a compositional semantics for first-order predicate logic that integrates our new results
with a reformulation of the pre-existing ones. Although this reformulation is a minor
departure from [3], we believe it has some interest in its own right.
2 Sets, functions, tuples, and relations
In this section we establish the notation and terminology for basic notions concerning sets,
functions, tuples, and relations.
2.1 Sets
We assume the sets of standard (Zermelo-Fraenkel) set theory. The sets specified in this
paper owe their existence to the axiom of specification: S′ defined as equal to {x ∈ S |
F} where F is an expression of which the truth depends of x. In spite of the axiom
of extensionality, according to which a set is entirely determined by its elements, we
distinguish S′ from {x ∈ T | F} even when T ⊇ S.
We denote the cardinality of a set V by |V |. For a finite V with |V | = n, we freely
confuse the finite cardinals with the corresponding ordinals and loosely refer to them
as “natural” numbers. As a result, locutions such as “for all i ∈ n” are common as
abbreviation of “for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}”.
2.2 Functions
The set of all functions from set S to set T , not both empty1, is denoted S → T , so that
we may write f ∈ (S → T ). To relieve the overloaded term “domain” we call S the source
and T the target of S → T and of any f belonging to it. All functions have one argument.
But the source may be a set that is composed of other sets.
The value of f at x ∈ S is written as fx or as fx. The process of ascertaining the value
of f at argument x is called the application of f to x. We often write “f(x)” instead of
“fx”; this can help clarify what gets applied to what.
The composition h of f ∈ (S → T ) and g ∈ (T → U) is written as g ◦ f and is
the function in S → U defined by x 7→ g(f(x)) for all x ∈ S. It is often convenient to
interchange the order of the arguments in g ◦ f . In such situations we write g ◦ f as f ⊲ g.
Definition 1 Given f ∈ (S → T ) we also use f to denote the set extension of f , which
is the function in 2S → 2T with map s 7→ {f(x) | x ∈ s}.
The inverse set extension f−1 of f is the function in 2T → 2S with map t 7→ {x ∈ S |
f(x) ∈ t}.
Lemma 1 Let f be a function in S → T . We have2 s ⊆ f−1(f(s)) for all s ⊆ S. We
have t = f(f−1(t)) for all t ⊆ T .
Definition 2 Let f ∈ (S → T ) and let S′ be a subset of S. The restriction f ↓ S′ of f to
S′ is the function in S′ → T with map x 7→ f(x). 
1 Our reason for this restriction is that we want |S → T | = |T ||S| to hold, and that this is defined
except when both S and T are empty. Thus S may be empty. In that case S → T contains one function,
which we could call the empty function with target T . Formally there is a different such function for every
different T .
2 That we do not have equality between the sets is necessitated by the possibility that f is not injective.
32.3 Tuples
Tuples are regarded as functions. When a function is a tuple, then the source of the
function is often referred to as its “index set”. The tuple t ∈ (n→ U), with the index set
n a natural number, can be written as (t0, . . . , tn−1). Tuples can also be indexed by other
sets. For example, consider a certain tuple f ∈ ({x, y, z} → {0, 1}) specified by f(x) = 0,
f(y) = 1, and f(z) = 0. We can achieve some abbreviation by listing the graph of f :
writing e.g. f = {〈z, 0〉, 〈x, 0〉, 〈y, 1〉}. Another possibility is a tabular representation of
this tuple: f =
x y z
0 1 0
. This has the advantage of a compact representation of a set
of tuples of the same type:
x y z
0 1 0
1 0 1
.
The source S of f ∈ (S → T ) may be a set of tuples, for example the set n→ U . The
value of f at t ∈ (n→ U) can be written f(t0, . . . , tn−1) as alternative to ft.
2.4 Relations
Definition 3 1. A relation R is a triple 〈I,D,C〉 of sets satisfying the constraint that
C ⊆ (I → D). I → D is the domain of the relation, I is the index set of the relation,
and C is the content of the relation.
2. When two relations have the same index set and the same domain, some of the
common operations on and relations between their contents can be extended:
〈I,D,C0〉 ⊆ 〈I,D,C1〉 iff C0 ⊆ C1
〈I,D,C0〉 ∩ 〈I,D,C1〉 = 〈I,D,C0 ∩ C1〉
〈I,D,C0〉 ∪ 〈I,D,C1〉 = 〈I,D,C0 ∪ C1〉
〈I,D,C0〉\〈I,D,C1〉 = 〈I,D,C0\C1〉
〈I,D,C〉∼ = 〈I,D, (I → D)\C〉
3. Let R0 = 〈I0, D,C0〉 and R1 = 〈I1, D,C1〉. We write the bowtie of R0 and R1 as
R0 ⋊⋉ R1 and define it to be 〈I0 ∪ I1, D,C〉 where
C = {r ∈ ((I0 ∪ I1)→ D) | (r ↓ I0) ∈ R0 and (r ↓ I1) ∈ R1}.
Similary for the oplus of R0 and R1, which is defined to be 〈I0 ∪ I1, D,C〉 where
C = {r ∈ ((I0 ∪ I1)→ D) | (r ↓ I0) ∈ R0 or (r ↓ I1) ∈ R1}.
4. Let R = 〈I,D,C〉 be a relation and let I ′ be a subset of I. Let R′ = 〈I ′, D,C′〉 be a
relation. We write the projection of R on I ′ as πI′(R) and define it to be
〈I ′, D, {c ↓ I ′ | c ∈ C}〉.
We write the cylinder in I on R′ as ρI(R
′) and define it to be
〈I,D, {c ∈ (I → D) | (c ↓ I ′) ∈ C′}〉.

When referring to a relation, its index set and domain are often clear from the context.
In such cases we refer to the relation by its content only.
4Example 1 Let I0 = {x, y}, I1 = {y, z}, and D = {a, b}, let R0 = 〈I0, D,
x y
a b
b a
〉 and
let R1 = 〈I1, D,
y z
a a
b a
〉.
We have R0 ⋊⋉ R1 = 〈{x, y, z}, D,
x y z
a b a
b a a
〉.We have R0 ⊕ R1 = 〈{x, y, z}, D,
x y z
a b a
a b b
b a a
b a b
a a a
b b a
〉.
Example 2
π{y}(〈{x, y}, {a, b},
x y
a a
a b
b b
〉) = 〈{y}, {a, b},
y
a
b
〉.
ρ{x,y}(〈{y}, {a, b},
y
a
b
〉) = 〈{x, y}, {a, b},
x y
a a
a b
b a
b b
〉.
⋊⋉ is similar to the numerous variants of “join” in relational databases (natural join,
equijoin, crossjoin, thetajoin, and perhaps others). To prevent confusion, we refer to the
⋊⋉ defined here as “bow tie”. ⊕ is forced into existence as the counterpart of bow tie,
and is new to us. For lack of a better term, we refer to it as “oplus”. “Projection” and
“cylinder” are inspired by Tarski et al. [3].
Note that bow tie and oplus are generalizations of intersection and union. In the
cylindric set algebra of [3] all relations have the same type (with the same infinite index
set) so that the generalization represented by bow tie and oplus is not needed.
If the index set I is n for some ordinal n, then the relation is said to be an n-ary
relation. It is a subset of Dn. It is said to be a type-P relation because it can be the
interpretation of a predicate symbol.
If I is the set of free variables of an expression, then the relation is said to be type C.
Thus the relation defined in Definition 7 on page 8 is a type-C relation. Here “C” is from
“cylinder” because the cylinders in cylindric algebra [3] are relations of this kind. Type-
C relations cannot be interpretations of predicate symbols, as the arguments in atomic
formulas are indexed numerically.
Lemma 2 Let R0 = 〈I0, D,C0〉, R1 = 〈I1, D,C1〉, and I = I0 ∪ I1. We have
R0 ⋊⋉ R1 = ρI(R0) ∩ ρI(R1)
R0 ⊕ R1 = ρI(R0) ∪ ρI(R1)
Proof
Immediate from the definitions. 
5Lemma 3
〈I ′, D,C〉 = πI′(ρI(〈I
′, D,C〉))
〈I,D,C〉 ⊆ ρI(πI′(〈I,D,C〉))

Proof
Note that the πI′ and ρI(πI of Definition 3 are respectively a set extension and inverse
set extension (Definition 1) of function restriction (Definition 2). With this identification,
the Lemma to be proved can be seen to follow from Lemma 1. 
We will encounter a situation involving a set X of n variables, a set D, and a tuple α
of type X → D. Let x = (x0, . . . , xn−1), a tuple of type n→ X , be an enumeration of X .
That is, there is no repeated occurrence of any variable in x = (x0, . . . , xn−1). The tuple t
defined as x ⊲ α is of type n→ D. We extend the function composition ⊲ from individual
tuples to relations, that is, to sets of tuples of the same type.
Definition 4
〈S, T, C0〉 ⊲ 〈T, U,C1〉 = 〈S,U, {d0 ⊲ d1 | d0 ∈ C0 ∧ d1 ∈ C1}〉.
With d0 ∈ (S → T ) and d1 ∈ (T → U) we write 〈S, T, C0〉 ⊲ d1 for 〈S, T, C0〉 ⊲ 〈T, U, {d1}〉
and d0 ⊲ 〈T, U,C1〉 for 〈S, T, {d0}〉 ⊲ 〈T, U,C1〉. 
Lemma 4 Let S and T be sets, not both empty. We have
S → S = (S → T ) ⊲ (T → S)
S → T = (S → S) ⊲ (S → T ) = (S → T ) ⊲ (T → T )

3 Satisfaction semantics
One aspect of semantics defines the conditions under which a sentence, i.e. a closed for-
mula, is true in (is satisfied by) an interpretation. We first review this aspect of semantics,
which we call satisfaction semantics. Then we show how it can also be applied to the
definition of relations and functions.
3.1 Logic preliminaries
Definition 5 1. A signature consists of
(a) A set of constant symbols.
(b) Sets of n-ary predicate symbols for nonnegative integers n. We denote the arity
of a predicate symbol q by |q|.
(c) Sets of n-ary function symbols for positive integers n. We denote the arity of
a function symbol f by |f |.
A term (formula) of first-order predicate logic is an L-term (L-formula) if the func-
tion and predicate symbols have the names and arities specified in L.
2. A structure consists of a universe D (also referred to as “domain”), which is a set,
and numerically-indexed relations and functions over D.
For a given signature L, a structure S with universe D is an L-structure whenever
6(a) each constant in L is associated with an element of D,
(b) each predicate symbol p in L is associated with a relation in S of type D|p|,
(c) and each function symbol f in L is associated with a function in S of type
D|f | → D.
3. Let a signature L and an L-structure S with domain D be given. An interpretation
of an L-term T consists of a mapping from each function symbol f of T to an |f |-ary
function of S. An interpretation of an L-formula F consists of a mapping from each
predicate symbol p of F to a |p|-ary relation of S.
Note that I(f) and I(p) are numerically indexed.
3.2 Satisfaction
Given a signature L and an interpretation I for L-formulas. Let D be the universe of
discourse of I. The truth value of an L-formula F with V as set of free variables depends
on I for the interpretation of the predicate and function symbols. It also depends on an
assignment α of individuals in D to the variables in V . That is, α is a function of type
V → D. With these dependencies in mind, we write M Iα(F ) for the meaning, that is a
truth value, of formula F .
M Iα(F ) is an expression in the metalanguage, which is informal mathematics. Here F
is the metalanguage name for a formula in first-order predicate logic.
The meaning ofM Iα(F ), with F a formula, is a truth value. The meaning ofM
I
α(t), with
t a term, is an individual in the universe of discourse D. The meaning of M Iα(t0, . . . , tn−1)
is an n-tuple of individuals in the universe of discourse D.
Several well-known textbooks [7, 10, 1, 2] define satisfaction semantics in substantial
agreement; [7, 2] attribute the definition to Tarski [12], which has been translated in [14]
and in [13]. Tarski’s paper addresses philosophers and argues that the concept of truth
can only be defined without danger of paradox in formalized languages and then only in a
suitable class of these. By the 1960’s Tarski’s satisfaction semantics had become folklore
to a sufficient extent that Shoenfield [10] and Enderton [1] give it without attribution.
Definition 6 Let L be a signature including at least one constant, a function symbol f ,
and a predicate symbol p. Let I be an interpretation for L with D as universe of discourse.
1. M Iα(t) = I(t) if t is a constant.
2. M Iα(t) = α(t) if t is a variable.
3. M Iα(t) = (I(f))(M
I
α(t0), . . . ,M
I
α(tn−1)) if t is f(t0, . . . , tn−1).
4. If p is a predicate symbol, then M Iα(p(t0, . . . , tn−1)) is true iff
(M Iα(t0), . . . ,M
I
α(tn−1)) ∈ I(p).
5. M Iα(¬F ) is true iff not M
I
α(F ).
6. Let F0 have V0 as set of free variables, let F1 have V1 as set of free variables, and
let V = V0 ∪ V1. Let α ∈ V → D.
We define M Iα(F0 ∧ F1) iff M
I
α↓V0
(F0) and M
I
α↓V1
(F1).
We define M Iα(F0 ∨ F1) iff M
I
α↓V0
(F0) or M
I
α↓V1
(F1).
7. Let F be a formula with set V of free variables. Let α be a tuple of type V → D.
Let, for some {x0, . . . , xn−1} ⊆ V and some di ∈ D for i ∈ n, α
′ ∈ (V → D) be such
that α′(xi) = di for all i ∈ n and α
′(v) = α(v) if v ∈ V \{x0, . . . , xn−1}.
7We define M I
α↓(V \{x0,...,xn−1})
(∃x0 . . . ∃xn−1. F ) iff there exist d0, . . . , dn−1 ∈ D such
that M Iα′(F ).
We define M I
α↓(V \{x0,...,xn−1})
(∀x0 . . . ∀xn−1. F ) iff for all d0, . . . , dn−1 ∈ D it is the
case that M Iα′(F ).
Conventionally, the language of first-order predicate logic has terms and formulas as
its syntactic categories. To these we add n-tuples of terms. Their denotation is defined as
follows.
M Iα(t0, . . . , tn−1) = (M
I
α(t0), . . . ,M
I
α(tn−1)) ∈ D
n.

We may write ∃V ′.F instead of ∃x0 . . .∃xn−1. F when V
′ = {x0, . . . , xn−1} is a subset of
the set of free variables of F . Similarly for universal quantification.
Lemma 5 In the context of Definition 6 we have
M Iα(f(t0, . . . , tn−1)) = (I(f))M
I
α(t0, . . . , tn−1).

Proof
Apply Definition 6. 
3.3 Application of satisfaction semantics to the definition of rela-
tions
In his treatment of set theory, Suppes [11] gives the Axiom of Separation (Zermelo’s
“Aussonderungsaxiom”) as
∃y∀x [x ∈ y ↔ (x ∈ z ∧ ϕ(x))] (1)
where z is a given set. This can be paraphrased to
if z is a set, then {x ∈ z | ϕ(x)} is a set. (2)
In this general formulation it is not specified in what language ϕ(x) is expressed. We
make ϕ(x) more specific by expressing it as a formula F of first-order predicate logic. Let
us call V the set of free variables in F . Then, given an interpretation I, the meaning of
F is determined by an assignment α of elements of D to the variables in V . That is, in
(2) the given set z becomes V → D and we get for the subset of z called into existence by
the Axiom of Separation:
{α ∈ (V → D) | F is true in I with α}, (3)
which is, using the formalism developed in this section,
{α ∈ (V → D) |M Iα(F )} (4)
We arrived at (4) in an attempt to clarify the Axiom of Separation by means of first-
order predicate logic. This expression can also be used to define the meaning of a formula
when an interpretation is given, abstracting away from the assignment α.
8Definition 7 The meaning of a formula F with set V of free variables, given interpreta-
tion I with domain D is written as M I(F ) and defined to be {α ∈ (V → D) |M Iα(F )}.
Definition 7 defines the meaning of F as a subset of V → D. That is, as a set of
tuples, which is the usual definition of a relation. A compositional semantics of first-order
predicate logic investigates how the meanings of the subformulas of F are connected to the
meaning of F itself. As these meanings are now seen to be relations, we need a suitable
set of operations on relations. These were defined in Section 2.4.
3.4 Application of satisfaction semantics to the definition of func-
tions
Tarski et al. [15, 3] defined certain relations as denotations of formulas with free variables.
A natural counterpart would be to define functions as denotations of terms. However,
this was omitted from [15, 3], as the language of logic there does not include function
symbols. In this section we introduce a counterpart of Definition 7 that defines a function
as denotation of any term. Such a definition is only interesting if the denotation of a
composite term is related in a plausible way to the denotations of its constituent terms.
This we do in Section 6.
Let t be a term with set V of variables. Let I be an interpretation for t with universe
of discourse D. Every α ∈ (V → D) determines M Iα(t) ∈ D. In other words, I and t
determine a function of type (V → D) → D. Hence we define the meaning M I(t) ∈
((V → D)→ D) of t as a function in the following way.
Definition 8 Given an interpretation I with domain D. Let t be a term with set V of
variables. We write the meaning of t as M I(t) and define it as the function in (V →
D)→ D with map α 7→M Iα(t). 
4 Compositional semantics of composite formulas
Lemma 6 M Iα(F ) iff α ∈M
I(F ) iff α ∈ {β ∈ (V → D) |M Iβ(F )}.
Definition 9 Let t0, . . . , tn−1 be a tuple of terms with set V of variables. Let I be an
interpretation for t0, . . . , tn−1 with universe D. We define
M I(t0, . . . , tn−1) = {M
I
α(t0, . . . , tn−1) | α ∈ (V → D)}.

We provide examples and lemmas to build intuition about the consequences of Defini-
tions 7 and 9.
Example 3 In Definition 9 one may regard the tuples of terms as a language to specify
subsets of n→ D, alias relations of type n→ D. For example M I(x, . . . , x) should denote
the diagonal of the set diagonals in n→ D.
M I(x, . . . , x) = (1)
{M Iα(x, . . . , x) | α ∈ ({x} → D)} = (2)
{(M Iα(x), . . . ,M
I
α(x)) | α ∈ ({x} → D)} = (3)
{(α(x), . . . , α(x)) | α ∈ ({x} → D)} = (4)
{(d, . . . , d) | d ∈ D}.
(1) Definition 9; (2) Lemma 5; (3) Definition 6; (4) let d = α(x) and note that for every
d ∈ D there is exactly on α ∈ ({x} → D) such that α(x) = d. 
9Example 4 Let I be an interpretation with universe of discourse D. Let {x0, . . . , xn−1}
be an enumeration of a set V of variables. In M I(x0, . . . , xn−1) ⊆ (n→ D) the arguments
are at their least constrained, so this expression should denote all of n→ D.
M I(x0, . . . , xn−1) = (1)
{(M Iα(x0), . . . ,M
I
α(xn−1)) | α ∈ (V → D)} = (2)
{(α(x0), . . . , α(xn−1)) | α ∈ (V → D)} = (3)
{(α(x0), . . . , α(xn−1)) | (x0, . . . , xn−1) ⊲ α ∈ ((x0, . . . , xn−1) ⊲ (V → D))} = (4)
{(d0, . . . , dn−1) | (x0, . . . , xn−1) ⊲ α ∈ ((x0, . . . , xn−1) ⊲ (V → D))} = (5)
{(d0, . . . , dn−1) | (x0, . . . , xn−1) ⊲ α ∈ (n→ D))} = (6)
{(d0, . . . , dn−1) | (d0, . . . , dn−1) ∈ (n→ D)} = (7)
n→ D.
(1) Definition 9 and Lemma 5; (2) Definition 6; (3) rewrite condition; (4) introduce the
names di for α(xi); (5) Definition 4; (6) definition of function composition; (7) meaning
of set comprehension. 
The compositional semantics of conjunction and disjunction is given by Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 Let F0 and F1 be formulas. Let I be an interpretation for the predicate and
function symbols of F0 and F1. We have
(a) M I(F0 ∧ F1) =M
I(F0) ⋊⋉M
I(F0)
(b) M I(F0 ∨ F1) =M
I(F0)⊕M
I(F0) and
(c) M I(¬F ) = M I(F )∼.
Proof
Let V0 and V1 be the sets of free variables of F0 and F1, respectively. Let D be the domain
of I.
M I(F0 ∧ F1) = (1)
{α ∈ ((V0 ∪ V1)→ D) |M
I
α(F0 ∧ F1)} = (2)
{α ∈ ((V0 ∪ V1)→ D) |M
I
α↓V0
(F0) and M
I
α↓V1
(F1)} = (3)
{α ∈ ((V0 ∪ V1)→ D) | α ↓ V0 ∈ {β ∈ V0 |M
I
β(F0)} and α ↓ V1 ∈ {γ ∈ V1 |M
I
γ (F1)}} = (4)
{α ∈ ((V0 ∪ V1)→ D) | α ↓ V0 ∈M
I(F0) and α ↓ V1 ∈M
I(F1)} = (5)
M I(F0) ⋊⋉M
I(F1).
(1): Definition 7, (2): Definition 6, (3): Lemma 6, (4): meaning of set comprehension, and
(5): Definition 3.
There is a similar proof of part (b). Proof of (c):
M I(¬F ) = (1)
{α ∈ (V → D) |M Iα(¬F )} = (2)
{α ∈ (V → D) | not M Iα(F )} = (3)
(V → D)\{α ∈ (V → D) |M Iα(F )} = (4)
(V → D)\M I(F ).
(1) Definition 7, (2) Definition 6, (3) meaning of set comprehension, (4) Definition 7.

This is basically a result from [3], where conjunction corresponds to intersection of
relations. The difference arises because there all relations have the same index set; in that
special case bow tie and intersection coincide, as do oplus and union.
Theorem 2 Let F be a formula with V as set of free variables. Let I be an interpretation
for the predicate and function symbols with D as universe of discourse. Let V ′ be a subset
of V. We have M I(∃V ′. F ) = πV \V ′M
I(F ).
10
Proof
M I(∃V ′. F ) = (1)
{α′ ∈ ((V \V ′)→ D) |M Iα′(∃V
′. F )} = (2)
{α′ ∈ ((V \V ′)→ D) | ∃α ∈ (V → D) s.t. M Iα(F ) and α ↓ (V \V
′) = α′} = (3)
{α ↓ (V \V ′) | α ∈M I(F )}
(1) Definition 7, (2) Definition 6, and (3) Definition 7.
This completes the proof, as the final expression is the content of the relation πV \V ′M
I(F )
according to Definition 3. 
5 Compositional semantics of atomic formulas
Tarski et al. [15, 3] introduced denotations for logic formulas only as motivation for
the introduction of cylindric algebras. They did not consider decomposition of atomic
formulas. Our primary interest is compositional semantics. This point of view demands a
semantic analysis of the inner structure of atomic formulas.
M I(p(t0, . . . , tn−1)) is determined by Definition 7. Yet it is also determined by the
denotation of its constituent p (according to I) and by that of its constituent (t0, . . . , tn−1)
(according to Definition 9). The following theorem shows how M I(p(t0, . . . , tn−1)) is
determined by the denotations of its constituents.
Theorem 3 Let L be a signature with a predicate symbol p. Let I be an L-interpretation
with universe of discourse D. Let t0, . . . , tn−1 be L-terms with V as union of the sets of
their variables.
We have
M I(p(t0, . . . , tn−1)) = (V → n) ⊲ (I(p) ∩M
I(t0, . . . , tn−1)).
Proof (1) Lemma 4,
(V → n) ⊲ (I(p) ∩M I(t0, . . . , tn−1)) = (1)
(V → n) ⊲ (I(p) ∩ {M Iα(t0, . . . , tn−1) | α ∈ (V → D)} = (2)
(V → n) ⊲ (I(p) ∩ {d ∈ (n→ D) | ∃α ∈ (V → D). d =M Iα(t0, . . . , tn−1)} = (3)
(V → n) ⊲ {d ∈ (n→ D) | ∃α ∈ (V → D). d ∈ I(p) ∧ d = M Iα(t0, . . . , tn−1)} = (4)
(V → n) ⊲ {d ∈ (n→ D) | ∃α ∈ (V → D). M Iα(p(t0, . . . , tn−1))} = (5)
{γ ⊲ d | γ ∈ (V → n) ∧ d ∈ (n→ D) ∧ ∃α ∈ (V → D) ∧M Iα(p(t0, . . . , tn−1))} = (6)
{α ∈ (V → D) |M Iα(p(t0, . . . , tn−1))} = (7)
M I(p(t0, . . . , tn−1)).
(1) Definition 9
(2) note that the set comprehension expression is the range of the function
λα ∈ (V → D). M Iα(t0, . . . , tn−1) and use the fact that
{f(x) | x ∈ S} = {y ∈ T | ∃x ∈ S. y = f(x)}
(3) eliminate the set intersection with I(p) by inserting the equivalent condition d ∈ I(p)
(4) Definition 6
(5) Definition 4
(6) give γ ⊲ d the name α′; this eliminates γ and d, and identify α′ with the α that exists
according to ∃α ∈ (V → D) in the condition
(7) Definition 7. 
Theorem 4 Let L be a signature containing a predicate symbol p. Let I be an L-interpretation
with universe of discourse D. Let t0, . . . , tn−1 be L-terms with V as union of their sets of
variables.
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We have
(n→ V ) ⊲ M I(p(t0, . . . , tn−1)) = I(p) ∩M
I(t0, . . . , tn−1).
Proof
I(p) ∩M I(t0, . . . , tn−1) = (1)
(n→ n) ⊲ (I(p) ∩M I(t0, . . . , tn−1)) = (2)
((n→ V ) ⊲ (V → n)) ⊲ (I(p) ∩M I(t0, . . . , tn−1)) = (3)
(n→ V ) ⊲ ((V → n)) ⊲ (I(p) ∩M I(t0, . . . , tn−1))) = (4)
(n→ V ) ⊲ M I(p(t0, . . . , tn−1)).
(1): Lemma 4, (2): Lemma 4, (3): Lemma 4, (4): Theorem 3. 
Corollary 1 Let L be a signature including predicate symbol p. Let I be an L-interpretation
with D as universe of discourse. Let {x0, . . . , xn−1} be a set of n variables. We have
(n→ {x0, . . . , xn−1}) ⊲ M
I(p(x0, . . . , xn−1)) = I(p).
Proof
(n→ {x0, . . . , xn−1}) ⊲ M
I(p(x0, . . . , xn−1)) = (1)
I(p) ∩M I((x0, . . . , xn−1)) = (2)
I(p) ∩ (n→ D) = (3)
I(p).
(1) Theorem 4, (2) Example 4, and (3) I(p) ⊆ (n→ D). 
Informally it is clear that the role of the arguments in p(t0, . . . , tn−1) is to restrict
the extent of the relation denoted by p. In Corollary 1 we see that if (t0, . . . , tn−1) is
as unrestrictive as possible, then we get all of I(p) back. In Example 3 we see that if
(t0, . . . , tn−1) is as restrictive as possible, then we get back only a diagonal slice of p.
In Theorem 4 the right-hand side is an expression of the intuition of the arguments
restricting the meaning of the relation denoted by the predicate symbol. Naively, the
right-hand side should equal M I(p(t0, . . . , tn−1)), but this is a C-type relation, whereas
the right-hand side is a P -type relation. The simplest fix of the discrepancy that is at
least prima facie correct is the composition in the left-hand side. That a simple fix yields
a correct formula is encouraging.
6 Compositional semantics of terms
M I(f(t0, . . . , tn−1)) is determined by Definition 8. Yet it is also determined by the de-
notation of its constituent f (according to I) and by that of its constituent (t0, . . . , tn−1)
(according to Definition 9). The following shows the way in which f(t0, . . . , tn−1) is de-
termined by the denotations of its constituents.
Theorem 5 Let L be a signature with a function symbol f . Let I be an L-interpretation
with universe of discourse D. Let t0, . . . , tn−1 be L-terms with V as union of the sets of
their variables.
We assert that for all α ∈ (V → D) there exists an x ∈ (n→ V ) such that
(M I(f(t0, . . . , tn−1)))(α) = (I(f) ↓M
I(t0, . . . , tn−1))(x ⊲ α).
See Figure 1.
Proof.
With b = (M I(f(t0, . . . , tn−1)))(α) we have
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✲
M Iα(f(t0, . . . , tn−1)
α ∈ (V → D)
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆
❆❆❯
x ∈ (n→ V )
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑✑✸
I(f) ↓M I(t0, . . . , tn−1)
b ∈ D
(x ⊲ α) ∈ (n→ D)
Figure 1: Diagram to illustrate Theorem 5, which asserts that the triangle commutes.
M I(f(t0, . . . , tn−1))(α) = (1)
(λβ ∈ (V → D). M Iβ(f(t0, . . . , tn−1)))(α) = (2)
M Iα(f(t0, . . . , tn−1)) = (3)
(I(f))(M Iα(t0), . . . ,M
I
α(tn−1)) = b.
(1): Definition 7, (2): beta reduction, and (3): Definition 6.
Furthermore,
(I(f))(M Iα(t0), . . . ,M
I
α(tn−1)) = b iff (1)
∃d ∈ (n→ D). (I(f))(d) = b ∧ d = (M Iα(t0), . . . ,M
I
α(tn−1)) ∧ d = x ⊲ α iff (2)
∃d ∈ (n→ D). (I(f))(d) = b ∧ d ∈M I(t0, . . . , tn−1) ∧ d = x ⊲ α iff (3)
(I(f) ↓M I(t0, . . . , tn−1))(x ⊲ α) = b.
(1): I(f) is a function in (n → D) → D, (2): Definition 9, and (3): Definition 2 for
function restriction. 
7 Conclusions
In 1933 Tarski identified first-order predicate logic [12] as a language in which the concept
of truth can be defined mathematically. The definition Tarski gave there, though math-
ematical, still fell short of the standard set by the semantics of propositional logic. This
semantics can be specified as a homeomorphism from the syntax algebra of propositions
to the semantic algebra of truth values. This homeomorphism is not an isolated example,
witness the following quote from [6]:
A technical description of the standard interpretation [of compositionality]
is that syntax and semantics are algebras, and meaning assignment is a ho-
momorphism from syntax to semantics. This definition of compositionality is
found with authors such as Montague [8], Janssen [5], and Hodges [4].
Compositional semantics for first-order predicate logic is described in [15, 3]. This
semantic algebra, the cylindric set algebra, has relations as carrier. These relations can
be regarded as generalized truth values.
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To us the most attractive feature of the algebraic approach is its compositional nature:
the meaning of a composite expression is the result of a set-theoretically defined operation
on the meanings of it components. In the existing work the decompositions thus treated
were conjunction, disjunction, negation and quantification. There is the additional limita-
tion that function symbols are absent. In this paper we give compositional semantics for
the full language of first-order predicate logic, including function symbols. Moreover, we
decompose atomic formulas and terms into their constituent predicate or function symbols
and tuples of arguments.
The original Tarskian semantics specifies the conditions under which a sentence is
satisfied by an interpretation. An interpretation assigns a relation as meaning to each
predicate symbol, a function as meaning to each function symbol. In the algebraic seman-
tics of Tarski et. al. there is no role for interpretation, so it is not possible to decompose
the meaning of an atomic formula: there is no meaning assigned to the bare predicate
symbol. In this paper we take interpretations into account and we give set-theoretic coun-
terparts for conjunction, disjunction, negation, quantification, as well as application of
predicate and function symbols to their arguments.
It is not surprising that our semantic structure is not the same as the one in the
algebraic semantics of Tarski et. al. Both structures can be described in terms of two
parameters: a set I of indexes and a set D which is the algebraic counterpart of the
universe of discourse. In cylindric algebra semantics the carrier consists of the subsets of
I → D. In our case it is the set of all relations of type I ′ → D with I ′ ⊆ I. In Definition 3
we identified the most important operations. In [9] many algebras for quantifier logics are
described. For the purpose of this paper it does not matter which, if any, of these matches
our carrier and set of operations.
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